By M K Bhadrakumar
A pall of gloom and uncertainty descended on Kathmandu with the United Nations Security Council decision to wind up the UNMIN (United Nations Mission in Nepal) last Friday. And there is a sense of triumphalism in Delhi that Indian diplomacy booted out the UNMIN from the region. The contrast in mood cannot be sharper.
India, which robustly pitches for permanent membership in the UN Security Council, rubbished the UNMIN as a hindrance to the peace process in Nepal. But the paradox can be explained. Delhi was never comfortable with the idea of the UN poking its nose into Nepal.
Delhi tried to block a UN presence but finally gave in to Nepalese
wish when it became apparent there was no other way to carry forward the impulses of the peace process following the overthrow of the monarchy in 2006 in a popular uprising. The Nepalese needed the UN to hold the hand of the armed revolutionaries, the so-called Maoists, and to arrange their disarming and rehabilitation - in short, facilitate their passage to a democratic way of life.
Who's afraid of the UN?
True, other "non-Maoist" political parties and the Nepalese army also began finding UNMIN's presence irksome for tactical reasons. But at the end of the day, it was India's staunch opposition to the watchdog's continued presence that sealed its fate. The "international community" could have explored how to make the UN mechanism more effective and relevant. Instead, it acquiesced with the Indian demand.
The expanding United States-India strategic condominium made the denouement possible. Washington chose to pragmatically give India a "free hand" in its backyard. Significantly, however, a joint statement issued in Kathmandu by the diplomatic missions of the US, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Japan and the European Union since reiterated, "We welcome the ongoing engagement of the United Nations as the international community continues to support the people of Nepal."
The UNMIN, which came into being in 2006 as an integral component of Nepal's peace agreements, had a specific mandate: a) monitoring the arms and personnel of Nepalese army and the so-called Maoists; b) assisting in the implementation of the 2006 agreement on the management of arms and personnel; and c) assisting in the conduct of the constituent assembly elections of April 2008.
During the four-year period since 2006, UNMIN served as a deterrent against resumption of violence. Indeed, there is a high degree of risk that in its absence, flashpoints could spiral out of control. However, Delhi's grouse is precisely that UNMIN exceeded its mandate and got itself involved in issues of Nepal's political economy - social exclusion and marginalization of underprivileged sections of Nepali population, armed groups of dubious background that operated in regions bordering India and the peace process itself.
Delhi and the traditional political parties in Nepal, which it supports, resented that UNMIN treated Maoists as "stakeholders" in national life. They estimated that the post-UNMIN phase would isolate Maoists and compel them to "reform" and "disarm". A prominent commentator Prashant Jha wrote in The Hindu:
Pushing UNMIN out is in line with India's broader Nepal policy, the key tenet of which is to isolate the Maoists and exclude them from the formal power structure as the only way of democratizing them ... To this end, India has invested enormous political capital in galvanizing the anti-Maoist forces together ... There is a section in both New Delhi and Kathmandu, which believes that like UNMIN, the Constituent Assembly [CA] where the Maoists command 40% of the seats is another ‘safety blanket' for the former rebels ... They are now hoping for its [CA's] dissolution.
The China factor
In short, Delhi's interference in Nepalese politics is set to enter a new phase. Its strongest allies are the Nepalese army and the army's political backers in Kathmandu. Delhi succeeded brilliantly in manipulating the exclusion of Maoists from power and didn't seem to be perturbed that it was abandoning the commitment to the principle of democratic control of political power, which has been the bedrock of the Indian state itself since independence in 1947.
The Indian establishment's excessively suspicious attitude towards the Maoists has so far colored its Nepal policy. One principal reason for the hostility lies in the Maoists' perceived closeness to China. But Beijing appears disinterested in a zero-sum game.
According to Indian security analysts, Beijing has even been advising the Maoist leadership to seek a cordial relationship with Delhi. A top Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai visited Delhi recently and sought to assure the Indian leaders about his party's sensitivity to Indian interests in Nepal.
Beijing's priorities are in terms of Nepal's overall stability, seeking Kathmandu's cooperation in checking the illegal movement of Tibetan activists to and from India, preventing Nepalese soil from being used by foreign intelligence agencies for subversive activities inside Tibet and the overall development of bilateral ties (especially economic and communication) so that whichever party is in power in Kathmandu remains sensitive to China's interests.
Quite obviously, Beijing factors in that the capacity of any foreign power to play the "Tibet card" can be effectively countered only by having a friendly government in Kathmandu. Towards this end, China casts its net wide among virtually all sections of the Nepalese society and politics and the state apparatus. Significantly, China didn't bother to challenge the Indian move in the Security Council to finish off the UNMIN.
Bhattarai urged the Indian establishment to play a constructive role in Nepal. But the big question is whether Delhi will rethink its hardline policy and reconcile with the shocking victory of the Maoists in the 2008 election where they won 40% of seats. The security agencies dictate India's policies and they also develop vested interests. They might see advantages in an unstable Nepal beholden to Indian largesse, although Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world.
Without doubt, it needs an assertive and intellectually resourceful foreign policy establishment (and a determined political leadership) to genuinely break from the past and charter a new course for India's Nepal policy.
Dreading the march of history
But the high probability is that "spooky" conspiracies may continue to be hatched so that the lifespan of the Constituent Assembly in Kathmandu lapses without fulfilling the task of drafting a new constitution. The temptation will always be there to bring Nepal under president's rule with the backing of the army.
The heart of the matter is that only Maoists among the major political players are genuine proponents of a new constitution while the other two mainstream parties with which Indian establishment works closely - Nepali Congress and Communist Party of Nepal - apprehend in varying degrees that a new constitution may undermine the established, traditional patronage networks. The Nepalese army shares their apprehensions.
Truly, India finds itself allied with retrogressive forces who dread the march of history. This polarization is of a fundamental nature. The Maoists and several splinter groups that are identity-based espouse progressive change. They stand for radical redistribution of power and resources in the country, whereas traditional parties abhor the prospect of a re-definition of the state and the role of elites in it.
The traditional parties backed by Delhi would have liked to co-opt Maoists into "bourgeois" democratic practices with their networks of patronage and privileges. For them, a new constitution - and a peace process leading to a new constitution, especially one that promises federalism and far-reaching political, economic and social inclusion - is not a priority at the present juncture, as it may erode their political base.
Delhi is betting that Maoists are averse to returning to the path of violence although getting squashed for political space and would gamble that the shine may have gone off the Maoists in the popular perceptions. The Maoists, on the other hand, have to decide whether it is worthwhile to make political concessions so as to sustain the push for a new constitution and at the same time widen their influence among constituencies such as the middle classes, apart from building bridges with Delhi so that they can face the next general election on a stronger footing.
However, their dilemma is acute: even if they make concessions, the traditional parties and the army (and Delhi) may still prefer the present transitional period to somehow end so that "normal" politics resumes in Kathmandu, which is all about sharing power and the loaves of office. (Transparency International ranks Nepal as the most corrupt country in South Asia.) Indeed, as Jha pointed out, "The reluctance of the non-Maoist parties to share power, the Maoist dogma, and India's hardline approach - all feed on one another and have contributed to mutual insecurities and belligerence on all sides, limiting the space for compromise."
The triumphalism in Delhi over the ouster of the UNMN is a telltale sign. The Indian establishment's agenda will be to somehow manipulate things to return to "bourgeois democracy", which means status quo ante before the unseemly Maoist dragon appeared as the collective voice of Nepali democratic opinion. They count on the Maoist leadership's extraordinary capacity for making political compromises at the last minute.
The recurrent fear of the Indian establishment and political elites is that the ascendance of Maoists in neighboring Nepal might inspire the left-wing armed cadres who dominate one third of India's districts to press ahead with their struggle to capture political power. Delhi seeks to snuff out the revolutionary fervor in Nepal so that it doesn't aggravate the serious political and socio-economic contradictions in the "red belt" within the Indian hinterland. Washington seems to empathize.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
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