By M K Bhadrakumar
A pall of gloom and uncertainty descended on Kathmandu with the United Nations Security Council decision to wind up the UNMIN (United Nations Mission in Nepal) last Friday. And there is a sense of triumphalism in Delhi that Indian diplomacy booted out the UNMIN from the region. The contrast in mood cannot be sharper.
India, which robustly pitches for permanent membership in the UN Security Council, rubbished the UNMIN as a hindrance to the peace process in Nepal. But the paradox can be explained. Delhi was never comfortable with the idea of the UN poking its nose into Nepal.
Delhi tried to block a UN presence but finally gave in to Nepalese
wish when it became apparent there was no other way to carry forward the impulses of the peace process following the overthrow of the monarchy in 2006 in a popular uprising. The Nepalese needed the UN to hold the hand of the armed revolutionaries, the so-called Maoists, and to arrange their disarming and rehabilitation - in short, facilitate their passage to a democratic way of life.
Who's afraid of the UN?
True, other "non-Maoist" political parties and the Nepalese army also began finding UNMIN's presence irksome for tactical reasons. But at the end of the day, it was India's staunch opposition to the watchdog's continued presence that sealed its fate. The "international community" could have explored how to make the UN mechanism more effective and relevant. Instead, it acquiesced with the Indian demand.
The expanding United States-India strategic condominium made the denouement possible. Washington chose to pragmatically give India a "free hand" in its backyard. Significantly, however, a joint statement issued in Kathmandu by the diplomatic missions of the US, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Japan and the European Union since reiterated, "We welcome the ongoing engagement of the United Nations as the international community continues to support the people of Nepal."
The UNMIN, which came into being in 2006 as an integral component of Nepal's peace agreements, had a specific mandate: a) monitoring the arms and personnel of Nepalese army and the so-called Maoists; b) assisting in the implementation of the 2006 agreement on the management of arms and personnel; and c) assisting in the conduct of the constituent assembly elections of April 2008.
During the four-year period since 2006, UNMIN served as a deterrent against resumption of violence. Indeed, there is a high degree of risk that in its absence, flashpoints could spiral out of control. However, Delhi's grouse is precisely that UNMIN exceeded its mandate and got itself involved in issues of Nepal's political economy - social exclusion and marginalization of underprivileged sections of Nepali population, armed groups of dubious background that operated in regions bordering India and the peace process itself.
Delhi and the traditional political parties in Nepal, which it supports, resented that UNMIN treated Maoists as "stakeholders" in national life. They estimated that the post-UNMIN phase would isolate Maoists and compel them to "reform" and "disarm". A prominent commentator Prashant Jha wrote in The Hindu:
Pushing UNMIN out is in line with India's broader Nepal policy, the key tenet of which is to isolate the Maoists and exclude them from the formal power structure as the only way of democratizing them ... To this end, India has invested enormous political capital in galvanizing the anti-Maoist forces together ... There is a section in both New Delhi and Kathmandu, which believes that like UNMIN, the Constituent Assembly [CA] where the Maoists command 40% of the seats is another ‘safety blanket' for the former rebels ... They are now hoping for its [CA's] dissolution.
The China factor
In short, Delhi's interference in Nepalese politics is set to enter a new phase. Its strongest allies are the Nepalese army and the army's political backers in Kathmandu. Delhi succeeded brilliantly in manipulating the exclusion of Maoists from power and didn't seem to be perturbed that it was abandoning the commitment to the principle of democratic control of political power, which has been the bedrock of the Indian state itself since independence in 1947.
The Indian establishment's excessively suspicious attitude towards the Maoists has so far colored its Nepal policy. One principal reason for the hostility lies in the Maoists' perceived closeness to China. But Beijing appears disinterested in a zero-sum game.
According to Indian security analysts, Beijing has even been advising the Maoist leadership to seek a cordial relationship with Delhi. A top Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai visited Delhi recently and sought to assure the Indian leaders about his party's sensitivity to Indian interests in Nepal.
Beijing's priorities are in terms of Nepal's overall stability, seeking Kathmandu's cooperation in checking the illegal movement of Tibetan activists to and from India, preventing Nepalese soil from being used by foreign intelligence agencies for subversive activities inside Tibet and the overall development of bilateral ties (especially economic and communication) so that whichever party is in power in Kathmandu remains sensitive to China's interests.
Quite obviously, Beijing factors in that the capacity of any foreign power to play the "Tibet card" can be effectively countered only by having a friendly government in Kathmandu. Towards this end, China casts its net wide among virtually all sections of the Nepalese society and politics and the state apparatus. Significantly, China didn't bother to challenge the Indian move in the Security Council to finish off the UNMIN.
Bhattarai urged the Indian establishment to play a constructive role in Nepal. But the big question is whether Delhi will rethink its hardline policy and reconcile with the shocking victory of the Maoists in the 2008 election where they won 40% of seats. The security agencies dictate India's policies and they also develop vested interests. They might see advantages in an unstable Nepal beholden to Indian largesse, although Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world.
Without doubt, it needs an assertive and intellectually resourceful foreign policy establishment (and a determined political leadership) to genuinely break from the past and charter a new course for India's Nepal policy.
Dreading the march of history
But the high probability is that "spooky" conspiracies may continue to be hatched so that the lifespan of the Constituent Assembly in Kathmandu lapses without fulfilling the task of drafting a new constitution. The temptation will always be there to bring Nepal under president's rule with the backing of the army.
The heart of the matter is that only Maoists among the major political players are genuine proponents of a new constitution while the other two mainstream parties with which Indian establishment works closely - Nepali Congress and Communist Party of Nepal - apprehend in varying degrees that a new constitution may undermine the established, traditional patronage networks. The Nepalese army shares their apprehensions.
Truly, India finds itself allied with retrogressive forces who dread the march of history. This polarization is of a fundamental nature. The Maoists and several splinter groups that are identity-based espouse progressive change. They stand for radical redistribution of power and resources in the country, whereas traditional parties abhor the prospect of a re-definition of the state and the role of elites in it.
The traditional parties backed by Delhi would have liked to co-opt Maoists into "bourgeois" democratic practices with their networks of patronage and privileges. For them, a new constitution - and a peace process leading to a new constitution, especially one that promises federalism and far-reaching political, economic and social inclusion - is not a priority at the present juncture, as it may erode their political base.
Delhi is betting that Maoists are averse to returning to the path of violence although getting squashed for political space and would gamble that the shine may have gone off the Maoists in the popular perceptions. The Maoists, on the other hand, have to decide whether it is worthwhile to make political concessions so as to sustain the push for a new constitution and at the same time widen their influence among constituencies such as the middle classes, apart from building bridges with Delhi so that they can face the next general election on a stronger footing.
However, their dilemma is acute: even if they make concessions, the traditional parties and the army (and Delhi) may still prefer the present transitional period to somehow end so that "normal" politics resumes in Kathmandu, which is all about sharing power and the loaves of office. (Transparency International ranks Nepal as the most corrupt country in South Asia.) Indeed, as Jha pointed out, "The reluctance of the non-Maoist parties to share power, the Maoist dogma, and India's hardline approach - all feed on one another and have contributed to mutual insecurities and belligerence on all sides, limiting the space for compromise."
The triumphalism in Delhi over the ouster of the UNMN is a telltale sign. The Indian establishment's agenda will be to somehow manipulate things to return to "bourgeois democracy", which means status quo ante before the unseemly Maoist dragon appeared as the collective voice of Nepali democratic opinion. They count on the Maoist leadership's extraordinary capacity for making political compromises at the last minute.
The recurrent fear of the Indian establishment and political elites is that the ascendance of Maoists in neighboring Nepal might inspire the left-wing armed cadres who dominate one third of India's districts to press ahead with their struggle to capture political power. Delhi seeks to snuff out the revolutionary fervor in Nepal so that it doesn't aggravate the serious political and socio-economic contradictions in the "red belt" within the Indian hinterland. Washington seems to empathize.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Showing posts with label US. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US. Show all posts
Tuesday, January 18, 2011
Wednesday, January 5, 2011
U.S. military killed 5,000 civilians during the Korean war
U.S. military killed 5,000 civilians during war
2011-01-04 18:27
Text
S. Korean panel wraps up investigation
At least 5,000 civilians were killed by the U.S. military during the Korean War, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission found Tuesday.
According to the truth panel, which was established in 2005 to reinvestigate past atrocities, a total of 4,091 civilian casualties were caused by the U.S. military in the first three months of the war, before the reclaim of Seoul in September 1950.
In the 141 cases confirmed, 3,608 were killed by aerial bombardment.
After the allied forces recaptured Seoul, some 1,200 people were killed in 31 cases involving the U.S. Army until the war’s end in 1953, the committee said.
It was the first time that a state-run organization has inspected civilian deaths by the U.S. military during the Korean War and publicized the estimated number.
Of the victims, 1,218 were in vulnerable groups, including 541 women, 223 children under 10 and 228 people older than 50.
Given that 21 out of 31 cases occurred in January and February in 1951 after the recapture of Seoul, the panel said, the deaths could be the victims of operations that targeted civilians or aimed to reduce areas to ashes.
One of the cases was the bombardment of Hongcheon, Gangwon Province, in which U.S. aircraft dropped bombs on 3,000 South Korean refugees, assuming that communist soldiers were hiding among them. The panel said hundreds of people died from the attack.
During the attacks, many of the victims were found to have been doing daily activities in their residential areas or fleeing the fighting. There were also some cases in which whole families ware massacred.
“The attacks may have been carried out in order to bombard villages suspected of being used as shelters for the communist soldiers and to cut the supply lines of Chinese troops,” the investigation said.
“Considering that the deaths were investigated based on the reports from bereaved family members, the actual number could be far more,” said an official of the panel.
The truth panel ended its three-year investigation on Dec. 31 last year, completing its inspection on 11,175 cases.
By Lee Ji-yoon (jylee@heraldm.com)
At least 5,000 civilians were killed by the U.S. military during the Korean War, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission found Tuesday.
According to the truth panel, which was established in 2005 to reinvestigate past atrocities, a total of 4,091 civilian casualties were caused by the U.S. military in the first three months of the war, before the reclaim of Seoul in September 1950.
In the 141 cases confirmed, 3,608 were killed by aerial bombardment.
After the allied forces recaptured Seoul, some 1,200 people were killed in 31 cases involving the U.S. Army until the war’s end in 1953, the committee said.
It was the first time that a state-run organization has inspected civilian deaths by the U.S. military during the Korean War and publicized the estimated number.
Of the victims, 1,218 were in vulnerable groups, including 541 women, 223 children under 10 and 228 people older than 50.
Given that 21 out of 31 cases occurred in January and February in 1951 after the recapture of Seoul, the panel said, the deaths could be the victims of operations that targeted civilians or aimed to reduce areas to ashes.
One of the cases was the bombardment of Hongcheon, Gangwon Province, in which U.S. aircraft dropped bombs on 3,000 South Korean refugees, assuming that communist soldiers were hiding among them. The panel said hundreds of people died from the attack.
During the attacks, many of the victims were found to have been doing daily activities in their residential areas or fleeing the fighting. There were also some cases in which whole families ware massacred.
“The attacks may have been carried out in order to bombard villages suspected of being used as shelters for the communist soldiers and to cut the supply lines of Chinese troops,” the investigation said.
“Considering that the deaths were investigated based on the reports from bereaved family members, the actual number could be far more,” said an official of the panel.
The truth panel ended its three-year investigation on Dec. 31 last year, completing its inspection on 11,175 cases.
By Lee Ji-yoon (jylee@heraldm.com)
| ||||
By Kim Rahn More than 5,000 civilians were killed by U.S. forces during the Korean War (1950-1953), a state agency said Tuesday, providing the first official tally on the figure. The report released by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea indicated that at least 5,291 civilians were killed by the U.S. forces after the three-year war broke out on June 25, 1950. Most deaths took place by Sept. 28 that year, when South Korea reclaimed the capital after retreating to southern parts of the peninsula — 4,091 people were killed in 141 battles. Among the 141, 90 cases of aerial bombing claimed 3,607 lives. This was because the U.S. forces, with their superior air force, bombed routes the North Korean military was likely to take or facilities the military was likely to use as bases. “While carrying out the bombing, the U.S. forces didn’t properly protect civilians and facilities, resulting in numerous deaths. The South Korean government and allied forces also failed to alert civilians to evacuate the bombing areas,” the report said. Women, children and the elderly made up a large portion in the death toll: Of 1,218 victims killed before the reclamation of Seoul, 45.5 percent were women. By age group, 18.3 percent of the 1,218 were aged under 10, and 18.7 percent, aged over 50. “It is because many of the victims were killed while at their residence or finding shelter together with family members. Therefore, the ratio of victims, who were supposed to be protected according to the Geneva Convention, was quite large,” the report said. The convention stipulates that civilians who are wounded, sick, old, children under 15, expectant mothers or mothers of children under seven should be specially protected. After the reclamation of the capital, an additional 1,200 civilians were killed in 31 incidents involving the U.S. forces. Of these, 21 took place between January and February 1951 during the forces’ scorch operations. The report is the first official data on such victims. “We drew up the statistics based on reports from the victims’ bereaved families or related civic groups. The actual number of victims may be larger if unreported cases are included,” an official of the commission said. The commission concluded its mission on Dec. 31 after dealing with 11,175 cases which people had asked it to investigate since April 2006. | ||||
| rahnita@koreatimes.co.kr http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/01/117_79170.html |
Monday, December 13, 2010
MONDAY INTERVIEW | Interview | Oped | ekantipur.com
MONDAY INTERVIEW | Interview | Oped | ekantipur.com
US national interest determines Nepal policy
The US ambassador, Scott DeLisi, has completed eight months in Nepal. He gave his first full-length interview to Akhilesh Upadhyay and Sudheer Sharma last week where he talked about the top US priorities in Nepal—the peace process and constitution writing. He also said that the US doesn’t view Nepal through an Indian prism but determines policies towards Nepal keeping its own national interest at heart.
Would you like to expand on the US government focus here in Nepal?
Every initiative is important. But the US government truly believes that there is nothing more important than moving the peace process ahead. Constitution writing is another important area, an area we are supporting with a lot of technical assistance. The development sector is also critical. The health sector has also been important. As has the urgent issue of food security. Other important issues are economic prosperity, democracy, governance and climate change.
What I don’t want to see is a setback in Nepal’s development timeline. We have seen this in Haiti and Pakistan. Security sector reform is another important issue that is getting a lot of attention. Another thing that is of interest to me is building the economy.
Where is the American focus in regards to the peace process and constitution drafting?
On the issue of the peace process our focus is the same as everyone else’s—on bringing the peace process to a conclusion. There has been progress, but it has been incremental and frustrating at times. But I believe this will ultimately move forward. And though it would have been ideal, all of the issues are not likely to be resolved before UNMIN leaves. But people need to remember that even then, it is not the end of the world, and certainly not the end of the peace process. I am worried that some people are going to believe that this is a crisis. But the parties are working on it. And even with UNMIN leaving, it does not mean that the international community is not going to support the rest of the process.
We will help with the process of integration, but there is very little that the international community can do in this. What we can do is assist in the rehabilitation of former combatants. We can help the special (committee) secretariat. But it is up to the parties to tell us what kind of assistance they want. It is important that the issue of integration and rehabilitation of combatants takes place because other parties are not going to accept the Maoists with an army in a multi-party democracy. On the issue of the constitution, there has been progress. The thematic committees have done a good job. The special task force has reached agreements on a number of issues ranging from judiciary to economy. But some issues remain. People ask us what kind of constitution it should be, but that is not for us to tell. Every country has to determine what constitutional structure works best for them. But what I would say is that in any successful democracy, there are some basic principles.
Do you have a bottom line as to what would be the desirable scenario before UNMIN departs?
The desirable scenario is that the integration and rehabilitation be completed. But there are questions whether we will get there or not. The minimum that the parties could do is assess what UNMIN is doing and figure out what functions they would like to retain and how they plan to do it. The reason why I say this is because the issues that are not at the heart and soul of the peace process should not distract from the real issues, which are integration, rehabilitation and the modalities to move the process forward. Even if these issues are not addressed by Jan. 15, they can still find a way.
You and a US Under-Secretary recently visited a cantonment in Chitwan.
What was your impression about the cantoned combatants given that one of the major issues is whether the majority of them would opt for rehabilitation
or integration?
During my first visit to the cantonment, I was curious how the combatants felt about the issues of integration and rehabilitation. I was struck that the majority of them said that they would like to be integrated. And this is important because they identify as soldiers and feel that they can contribute. I was also struck by their answer in what they aspired for. They said they wanted a democratic Nepal and they wanted to make a contribution to their country. But part of the problem is that the combatants have not been presented with a rehabilitation package. And when they may be presented with the package, some of them may decide rehabilitation is not such a bad idea. I was struck as well when I asked them if they had any concerns about integration—things like might you find that the soldiers in the Army view you as enemies. And they said they are not worried about it. They said they saw soldiers as their brothers even during the conflict. They felt no resentment or animosity and said that this would be a smooth process. What I told them was realistically speaking, not everyone hoping to be integrated will be. It is up to the parties to determine that number. I told them that if some of them were not integrated, there are other many ways of making contributions to the country.
You have talked about the US government’s willingness to provide rehabilitation package. Are there any plans regarding this?
No, there is nothing like a concrete plan because, until the parties decide on this, it is hard for us to come with any plan. We have told them illustratively of the help that we could offer. We could help the special secretariat become more effective. We could help in setting up field offices and providing logistics. In terms of rehabilitation, many of our development programmes could serve as a model. In October, when I was in Washington, I told my colleagues of the problem and they all realised the importance of helping in the process. We can bring resources to table, but parties need to be clear as to how they would like to move forward.
How do you view the ongoing political impasse and where do you think the parties could be more accommodative?
The political transition that Nepal has gone through in last 20 years is something that countries undergo in 200 years. So this compression of history has had its impact. Parties need to learn to work in the new structure where there is no monarchy. They have to better understand each other. But it seems the parties are having problems comprehending this, even established parties. As I told you earlier, I was in Washington in October and the tenth round of elections (for the post of prime minister) had just finished. When my colleagues questioned me about the political crisis in Nepal, I told them that it is more important to get a government through a process rather than have one that will last for only few months. And this is something that will take time. I understand why everyone is frustrated with the political process, including the donor community. We would like to see the formation of a new government so that we could work with a government with a clear mandate. But the process continues. The budget was passed, though it was not done in a pretty way.
Let us talk about the larger foreign policy priorities of the US in South Asia.
We would like to see Nepal as a democratic state that respects rights of its citizens, and whose leadership functions as per the rules and laws. This is what we would like to see for the other countries in the region as well. We would like to see the countries in South Asia cooperate among themselves so that tensions are reduced. We understand that there are problems in the region. There are problems in Pakistan and Afghanistan. And the fear is when governments are not effective, it presents opportunities to those who want to create problems in the world. So we would like to see the economy grow in the region along with trade relations. I know Nepal needs to move on with the constitution writing process if before much more progress in the economy and other areas can be expected. Everybody, including India and China I believe, would like to see a stable Nepal. This is something all of us share.
As the priorities of the US shift in the region, the US policy on Nepal is often said to be viewed through an Indian prism, as India seems to be the strategic partner of the US in the region?
I have heard this ever since I came here. We have a strategic dialogue with India. India is an important partner for us. And it is a growing relationship. Let me assure you the United States has neither lost interest in Nepal nor do we view our policy on Nepal through India’s prism. We determine our policy towards Nepal keeping our own national interest in mind.
India, China and the US are often perceived as competing powers in Nepal.
I don’t think they are competing powers in Nepal. We have our own engagement here. We would like to see Nepal as a stable and peaceful country. And as of Jan. 1, all of us will be sitting in the Security Council and monitoring the progress in Nepal.
Wikileaks is said to have found messages sent from the US mission in Kathmandu to Washington. Do you think this will have an impact on bilateral relations?
I think no matter what Wikileaks may reveal, the messages we send our government every day are important. And they are concerned with the peace process, constitution writing and development. And those commitments on the parts of US will remain. I talked to the foreign minister, Sujata Koirala, about this and she agreed.
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