REVIEW | Inconvenient truths (In a nutshell, only the Dixit company knows Nepal like no one else does...my a**)

Provocative new book is for pluralism and against populism 

KUL CHANDRA GAUTAM

FROM ISSUE #550 (22 APRIL 2011 - 28 APRIL 2011) | TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Peace Politics in Nepal: An Opinion from Within by Kanak Mani Dixit|Himal Books|300 pages|Rs 480

In his new book Peace Politics in Nepal, Kanak Mani Dixit captures much of what his earlier Nepali book, Dekheko Muluk, contains, but adds some new chapters and updates developments of the past year for the benefit of English speaking readers, particularly for our friends from the international community who take much interest in Nepal.
Dixit is not a diplomat. His language is blunt and straight-forward. He dares, and even relishes, to speak truth to power and
populism. For some of us--scholars, intellectuals and diplomats included--who are trained to be politically correct, sit on the fence and play it safe, his new book, Peace Politics of Nepal, makes uncomfortable reading. This book may as well have been titled Inconvenient Truths of Current Nepali Politics.
Dixit is often portrayed as a part of the Kathmandu elite, an upper-class, upper-caste Bahun, strongly anti-Maoist, perhaps a little right-wing and a status quoist. What you see often depends on where you stand. That caricature of Dixit may be accurate if you see Nepal in simple, black and white terms: as being sharply divided between feudal, conservative, counter-revolutionary stooges of imperialist, capitalist, foreign-agents dominated by the upper-class Bahun-Chhetris who purposely and deliberately dominate, oppress and conspire to perpetuate a deeply unjust, unfair, discriminatory and oppressive system against the poor, the marginalised, the deprived and you feel that you can only change it through revolutionary violence and radical restructuring of the state.
A logical corollary therefore would be, as King Mahendra said in justifying the Panchayat regime, that Western-style liberal democracy is unsuitable to solve Nepal's problems. Dixit, however, argues that it was precisely the open society, political freedoms, respect for pluralism of views that multi-party democracy of the 1990s allowed and encouraged that enabled us to bring to prominence the issues of the deeply entrenched disparities and discrimination, inequalities and injustices. It even allowed the freedom for a radical Maoist movement to rise in Nepal, at a time when Communism was collapsing all over the world. Democracy takes time to evolve and correct its own shortcomings. Dixit argues that the infant and imperfect democracy of the 1990s was not given enough time.

The populist thesis in vogue in Nepal right now, and one that seems to be subscribed even by some diplomats and donors of Western democracies, is that the 1990s Nepal experience in democracy was an utter failure. Dixit asks us to look at some of the successes of the 1990s before the Maoist insurgency derailed them.
Knowing Dixit has a reputation for being a little partisan, I read the manuscript carefully to detect how his partisanship manifests itself. And yes, I can confirm to you that indeed Dixit is very partisan. He is unapologetic and biased in favour of non-violence, liberal democracy and pluralism, which many of us would not find as big sins. He has a gripe against many members of the international community who do not have a deep enough understanding of Nepal's complex history and subscribe too easily to the populist characterisation of Nepal as so deeply divided by entrenched caste, class and ethnic divisions that to solve such problems, Nepalis should be prepared to accept, at least temporarily, some radical, less than fully non-violent and undemocratic solutions which they would not accept in their own countries.
He sees diplomats, donors and consultants of many Western countries, even some UN officials as having a rather romantic view of the Maoist agenda for social change. He faults the analysis contained in reports of organisations like the International Crisis Group (ICG) as showing a subtle bias that castigates the NC and UML as status quoist, and the Maoists as the true agents of progressive change.
I must say, when I was myself at the UN, I used to rely heavily on reports of ICG, the Carter Center and the UN to better understand what was happening in Nepal. These are all institutions that I respect deeply. On the whole, I continue to find their analysis solid and serious. So let me suggest this â€" for those who rely heavily on their reports, it would be beneficial to have Peace Politics of Nepal handy to consult as a counter-check and to provide some context. Every chapter of this book is interesting and insightful, and easy to read. I recommend that you read it with an open mind.
I want to say a few words on three chapters: one that made me really sad, one that I found very courageous and revealing, and one on which no matter where we stand on the ideological spectrum, we would all agree if we think of ourselves as just human beings with human empathy.
The chapter that made me really sad was the one dealing with the UN Mission to Nepal (UNMIN), which Dixit rather unkindly titles "Uncivil Mission". As someone with a long association with the UN, my natural instinct was to disagree with Dixit's harsh judgment of UNMIN. But, it must be said, UNMIN was not as conducive to pressuring the Maoists to give up violence and intimidation, to convince the other parties that it could be counted on to firmly stand on the side of democracy, and that its reporting would provide the most objective basis for the Secretary-General and Security Council to understand Nepal.
Kanak makes some sweeping remarks about UNMIN's bias, but does not quite document it. I would commend to you a Note Verbale that the Permanent Representative of Nepal circulated to members of the Security Council last year documenting point by point how the report of the SG and the statement introducing it by the SRSG was biased and inaccurate. Coming from a very seasoned professional diplomat, it was an unusually blunt and bad indictment of the SRSG's analysis. Dixit also alleges that the UN's Department of Political Affairs was very dismissive of all views that were critical of it and of UNMIN. I saw this in a very curt letter that was written on behalf of the Secretary-General in response to a joint letter by four former Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Nepal. Knowing the Secretary-General personally, as I do, I can tell you the S-G would have shown greater respect for those Foreign Ministers if he were asked to personally clear such a letter on his behalf. So sadly, even if I like to disagree with Dixit, and I do so in some of the choice of his words, I do agree with the substance of his critique of UNMIN.
In the chapter on federalism Dixit dares to address an issue which most sophisticated Bahun-Chhetri intellectuals consider taboo for fear that it will draw the wrath of the advocates of ethnicity-based federalism. As we know, of all the subjects on the drafting of the new Constitution, none is more emotionally charged than the issue of federalism. While fully supportive of economically viable federal structure that ensures greater inclusiveness and better representation of marginalised groups, Dixit questions the rationale for ethnic Bantustans.
There is a lot of hypocrisy on the discourse on federalism in Nepal. Many leaders â€" including some Maoists, and not just Bahun-Chhetris but many thoughtful Madheshis and Janajatis, privately tell you that they do not consider ethnic federations or Ek-Madhesh-Ek Pradesh as a sensible idea, but they keep mum in public. Dixit is to be thanked for opening up this subject for a thoughtful, dispassionate debate which is what we need, on all subjects, in drafting a national constitution.
The book argues that Nepal's peace process cannot be considered complete so long as the thousands of victims of conflict do not get justice. There is a real fear, Dixit argues, that both the Maoists and the Nepal Army would rather that we "forgive and forget" the terrible atrocities committed during the conflict.
This is an issue we must look at from the victims' perspective, not that of their victimisers who will find many reasons to justify their actions. Instead of "forgive and forget", Dixit argues, "forgive perhaps, but investigate, prosecute, and never forget" should be our message to both Maoists and our national security services. Beyond "Truth and Reconciliation" , we must go on to genuine help for the rehabilitation of the victims of violence, and a massive post-conflict reconstruction and development that will help Nepal recover from 15 years of economic stagnation. That has been the real curse of the "People's War" and response to it, of which all of us Nepalis have been victims.
In the last chapters of the book Dixit concludes on an optimistic note that in the end the Nepalese genius for finding sensible solutions will prevail, and we will have a progressive, democratic constitution. But he worries about some continuing, undemocratic revolutionary romanticism. And he insists that the new constitution must be an advance from the 1990 constitution, and not a further regression. He worries about some continuing, undemocratic revolutionary romanticism. He insists that the new constitution must be an advance from the 1990 Constitution, and not a further regression.
When reading that, I said, "Come on, Kanak, is there a real fear that we could have a less democratic Constitution than that of 1990, after the great people's movement and revolution we have gone through? You must be kidding!" Then I re-read the 1990 Constitution, juxtaposing it with this draft "Constitution of Peoples Federal Republic of Nepal â€" 2067" that was presented by the UCPN (Maoist) as containing the most progressive ideas for a 21st century "Peoples" constitution. And yes, I can see that, God forbid, it is possible for us to go backwards even as we recite progressive slogans.
Then, just for comparisons sake, I went on the internet and read the 1998 Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which I found very revealing. Let me quote a couple of articles from that Constitution:
- Article 66 says: "All citizens who have reached the age of 17 have the right to elect and to be elected irrespective of sex, race, occupation, length of residence, property status, party affiliation, political views or religion".
Wow, although I have been to North Korea many times, somehow I had missed that it allowed different party affiliations and political views ….
- And I quote article 67 that says, "Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, demonstration and association. The State shall guarantee conditions for the free activity of democratic political parties and social organizations".
Please note, North Korea too apparently allows multi-party system, provided they are "democratic", as determined by the ruling vanguard Party, of course. This is the danger I see in a multi-party system suggested in the UCPN(M) draft, without the acceptance of pluralism. We cannot really address issues of social justice, equity, inclusion and all the other advances we seek in our new Constitution, in a sustainable manner, if we do not accept pluralism.
I hope this book will inspire us to strive for and insist on, a model of New Nepal that seeks both socio-economic justice and political freedoms, in a non-North Korean style and substance.

Kul Chandra Gautam is a former Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations and this review is adapted from his presentation at the launch of the book, Peace Politics in Nepal, on 19 April.

http://nepalitimes.com/issue/2011/04/26/Review/18125

Congress unveils six-lane path to peace

Added At:  2011-04-16 12:12 AM  

Last Updated At: 2011-04-16 12:12 AM

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PRAKASH ACHARYA

KATHMANDU: Stating that there is no possibility of promulgating the new constitution without completing the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist combatants, main opposition Nepali Congress today brought a six-point action plan for the peace process.

A panel led by senior leader Sher Bahadur Deuba today presented the five-page document, which dealt with NC’s bottom-line for completing the peace process, at the party’s Central Working Committee meeting at the party headquarters in Sanepa. Following the discussion on the document, the party will approve it making it the party’s authentic version tomorrow, according to party sources.

The document, however, does not mention the time limit to complete the peace process. Without specifying the number, it has suggested to fix the number of combatants as per the past agreement made at the leadership level. However, the combatants will have to fulfil the basic requirements of the concerned security bodies for integration and they will remain under the command and control of the bodies. All UNMIN verified weapons will be brought under government control.

It adds that those who want voluntary retirement should be allowed to leave the camps and for those who want to be rehabilitated package should be prepared to provide them with seed money.

The government will provide security to the camps to be integrated and to rehabilitated combatants, states the document.

NC has been claiming that late NC leader Girija Prasad Koirala and Unified CPN-Maoist chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal had made a verbal agreement to integrate 3,000-5,000 combatants in different security bodies, before signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006. The UCPN-M, however, says that although the number was discussed, it was not agreed upon.

The plan seeks to ensure justice for the conflict victims by declaring the people killed by Maoists as martyrs and providing relief and compensation to their families and the families of those who sustained disability during the conflict, providing their children free education, giving priority to their children for employment and arranging treatment for injured people.

It adds that all property seized during the conflict should be returned to the rightful owners and all interest and principal up to Rs 1 million of bank loan be waived of for victims.

The displaced people should be rehabilitated by providing them relief and keeping

their proper record, adds

the document.

Meanwhile, another panel led by Parliamentary Party leader Ram Chandra Paudel is holding consultation with experts about the issues of state restructuring. Paudel told today’s CWC meeting that he would submit his report in a week.

Action plan

• Ensure justice for conflict victims

• Pass a Bill to form a commission on disappeared people

• Pass a Bill to form a Commission on Truth and Reconciliation Commission — probe the violent incidents during the conflict and make arrangements for reconciliation of conflicting parties

• Activate all-party peace committees at central (Peace and Reconstruction Ministry) and local levels

• Manage combatants

• Put an end to dual security for Maoist leaders — from government and combatants — and scrap paramilitary forces of the party. In addition, the government should impound all illegal vehicles used by Maoists and take legal action

http://www.thehimalayantimes.com/rssReference.php?headline=Congress+unveils+six-lane+path+to+peace&NewsID=284188

A fraught moment in Nepal

By M K Bhadrakumar

A pall of gloom and uncertainty descended on Kathmandu with the United Nations Security Council decision to wind up the UNMIN (United Nations Mission in Nepal) last Friday. And there is a sense of triumphalism in Delhi that Indian diplomacy booted out the UNMIN from the region. The contrast in mood cannot be sharper.

India, which robustly pitches for permanent membership in the UN Security Council, rubbished the UNMIN as a hindrance to the peace process in Nepal. But the paradox can be explained. Delhi was never comfortable with the idea of the UN poking its nose into Nepal.

Delhi tried to block a UN presence but finally gave in to Nepalese



wish when it became apparent there was no other way to carry forward the impulses of the peace process following the overthrow of the monarchy in 2006 in a popular uprising. The Nepalese needed the UN to hold the hand of the armed revolutionaries, the so-called Maoists, and to arrange their disarming and rehabilitation - in short, facilitate their passage to a democratic way of life.

Who's afraid of the UN?
True, other "non-Maoist" political parties and the Nepalese army also began finding UNMIN's presence irksome for tactical reasons. But at the end of the day, it was India's staunch opposition to the watchdog's continued presence that sealed its fate. The "international community" could have explored how to make the UN mechanism more effective and relevant. Instead, it acquiesced with the Indian demand.

The expanding United States-India strategic condominium made the denouement possible. Washington chose to pragmatically give India a "free hand" in its backyard. Significantly, however, a joint statement issued in Kathmandu by the diplomatic missions of the US, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Japan and the European Union since reiterated, "We welcome the ongoing engagement of the United Nations as the international community continues to support the people of Nepal."

The UNMIN, which came into being in 2006 as an integral component of Nepal's peace agreements, had a specific mandate: a) monitoring the arms and personnel of Nepalese army and the so-called Maoists; b) assisting in the implementation of the 2006 agreement on the management of arms and personnel; and c) assisting in the conduct of the constituent assembly elections of April 2008.

During the four-year period since 2006, UNMIN served as a deterrent against resumption of violence. Indeed, there is a high degree of risk that in its absence, flashpoints could spiral out of control. However, Delhi's grouse is precisely that UNMIN exceeded its mandate and got itself involved in issues of Nepal's political economy - social exclusion and marginalization of underprivileged sections of Nepali population, armed groups of dubious background that operated in regions bordering India and the peace process itself.

Delhi and the traditional political parties in Nepal, which it supports, resented that UNMIN treated Maoists as "stakeholders" in national life. They estimated that the post-UNMIN phase would isolate Maoists and compel them to "reform" and "disarm". A prominent commentator Prashant Jha wrote in The Hindu:
Pushing UNMIN out is in line with India's broader Nepal policy, the key tenet of which is to isolate the Maoists and exclude them from the formal power structure as the only way of democratizing them ... To this end, India has invested enormous political capital in galvanizing the anti-Maoist forces together ... There is a section in both New Delhi and Kathmandu, which believes that like UNMIN, the Constituent Assembly [CA] where the Maoists command 40% of the seats is another ‘safety blanket' for the former rebels ... They are now hoping for its [CA's] dissolution.
The China factor
In short, Delhi's interference in Nepalese politics is set to enter a new phase. Its strongest allies are the Nepalese army and the army's political backers in Kathmandu. Delhi succeeded brilliantly in manipulating the exclusion of Maoists from power and didn't seem to be perturbed that it was abandoning the commitment to the principle of democratic control of political power, which has been the bedrock of the Indian state itself since independence in 1947.

The Indian establishment's excessively suspicious attitude towards the Maoists has so far colored its Nepal policy. One principal reason for the hostility lies in the Maoists' perceived closeness to China. But Beijing appears disinterested in a zero-sum game.

According to Indian security analysts, Beijing has even been advising the Maoist leadership to seek a cordial relationship with Delhi. A top Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai visited Delhi recently and sought to assure the Indian leaders about his party's sensitivity to Indian interests in Nepal.

Beijing's priorities are in terms of Nepal's overall stability, seeking Kathmandu's cooperation in checking the illegal movement of Tibetan activists to and from India, preventing Nepalese soil from being used by foreign intelligence agencies for subversive activities inside Tibet and the overall development of bilateral ties (especially economic and communication) so that whichever party is in power in Kathmandu remains sensitive to China's interests.

Quite obviously, Beijing factors in that the capacity of any foreign power to play the "Tibet card" can be effectively countered only by having a friendly government in Kathmandu. Towards this end, China casts its net wide among virtually all sections of the Nepalese society and politics and the state apparatus. Significantly, China didn't bother to challenge the Indian move in the Security Council to finish off the UNMIN.

Bhattarai urged the Indian establishment to play a constructive role in Nepal. But the big question is whether Delhi will rethink its hardline policy and reconcile with the shocking victory of the Maoists in the 2008 election where they won 40% of seats. The security agencies dictate India's policies and they also develop vested interests. They might see advantages in an unstable Nepal beholden to Indian largesse, although Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world.

Without doubt, it needs an assertive and intellectually resourceful foreign policy establishment (and a determined political leadership) to genuinely break from the past and charter a new course for India's Nepal policy.

Dreading the march of history
But the high probability is that "spooky" conspiracies may continue to be hatched so that the lifespan of the Constituent Assembly in Kathmandu lapses without fulfilling the task of drafting a new constitution. The temptation will always be there to bring Nepal under president's rule with the backing of the army.

The heart of the matter is that only Maoists among the major political players are genuine proponents of a new constitution while the other two mainstream parties with which Indian establishment works closely - Nepali Congress and Communist Party of Nepal - apprehend in varying degrees that a new constitution may undermine the established, traditional patronage networks. The Nepalese army shares their apprehensions.

Truly, India finds itself allied with retrogressive forces who dread the march of history. This polarization is of a fundamental nature. The Maoists and several splinter groups that are identity-based espouse progressive change. They stand for radical redistribution of power and resources in the country, whereas traditional parties abhor the prospect of a re-definition of the state and the role of elites in it.

The traditional parties backed by Delhi would have liked to co-opt Maoists into "bourgeois" democratic practices with their networks of patronage and privileges. For them, a new constitution - and a peace process leading to a new constitution, especially one that promises federalism and far-reaching political, economic and social inclusion - is not a priority at the present juncture, as it may erode their political base.

Delhi is betting that Maoists are averse to returning to the path of violence although getting squashed for political space and would gamble that the shine may have gone off the Maoists in the popular perceptions. The Maoists, on the other hand, have to decide whether it is worthwhile to make political concessions so as to sustain the push for a new constitution and at the same time widen their influence among constituencies such as the middle classes, apart from building bridges with Delhi so that they can face the next general election on a stronger footing.

However, their dilemma is acute: even if they make concessions, the traditional parties and the army (and Delhi) may still prefer the present transitional period to somehow end so that "normal" politics resumes in Kathmandu, which is all about sharing power and the loaves of office. (Transparency International ranks Nepal as the most corrupt country in South Asia.) Indeed, as Jha pointed out, "The reluctance of the non-Maoist parties to share power, the Maoist dogma, and India's hardline approach - all feed on one another and have contributed to mutual insecurities and belligerence on all sides, limiting the space for compromise."

The triumphalism in Delhi over the ouster of the UNMN is a telltale sign. The Indian establishment's agenda will be to somehow manipulate things to return to "bourgeois democracy", which means status quo ante before the unseemly Maoist dragon appeared as the collective voice of Nepali democratic opinion. They count on the Maoist leadership's extraordinary capacity for making political compromises at the last minute.

The recurrent fear of the Indian establishment and political elites is that the ascendance of Maoists in neighboring Nepal might inspire the left-wing armed cadres who dominate one third of India's districts to press ahead with their struggle to capture political power. Delhi seeks to snuff out the revolutionary fervor in Nepal so that it doesn't aggravate the serious political and socio-economic contradictions in the "red belt" within the Indian hinterland. Washington seems to empathize.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

Nepal: Identity Politics and Federalism

Asia Report N°19913 Jan 2011

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Federal restructuring of the state has emerged as a major demand of ethnic and regional activists in Nepal. The debate about it is extremely politicised. Federalism is not simply the decentralisation of political power; it has become a powerful symbol for a wider agenda of inclusion, which encompasses other institutional reforms to guarantee ethnic proportional representation and a redefinition of Nepali nationalism to recognise the country’s ethnic and cultural diversity.

Activists demand the introduction of reservations to guarantee proportional representation of marginalised groups in government and administration. They want provinces to be named after the most numerous ethnic and regional groups and boundaries drawn to make them dominant minorities. Some claim to be indigenous to these regions and demand preferential rights to natural resources and agradhikar – priority entitlement to political leadership positions in the future provinces.

Ethnic and regional demands were important parts of the Maoist agenda during the civil war; in eastern Nepal, much of their support depended on it. State restructuring became a central component of the 2006 peace deal. After violent protests in the Tarai in 2007, federalism was included in the interim constitution as a binding principle for the Constituent Assembly.

But of the three major parties, the Maoists are the only one to give full-throated support to federalism and the establishment of ethnic provinces. Identity politics may sit uneasily with their class-based ideological framework but federalism is of great importance for them. Now that the former Hindu kingdom is a secular republic, it is the most important point left on their short-term transformative agenda. Much grassroots support, the loyalty of ethnic and regionalist activists within the party and their wider credibility as a force for change depend on them following through.

Both the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), UML, have accepted federal restructuring. They have actively participated in drafting a federal model in the Constituent Assembly. There is agreement on most institutional arrangements including the division of powers between provinces and centre. But this process has been driven by longstanding proponents of federalism within both parties, none of them very influential. It is unclear whether there is a wider consensus. Both parties have agreed to federalism in the spirit of bargaining; neither of them owns the agenda. Behind the official positions there is significant resistance to it.

Backtracking on federalism is politically impossible. Both the NC and UML are already struggling to retain cadres and leaders from minority backgrounds. But deferring crucial decisions, or stalling the constitutional process altogether, could be tempting for those opposed to change. The assumption that the Maoists have both the most to gain and the most to lose from the constitutional process could lend wider appeal to the idea.

The risks are hard to calculate. Ethnic and regionalist groups, already suspicious of the major parties’ commitment to federalism, threaten protests and ultimately violent resistance should it not come. Their eyes are on the 28 May 2011 deadline for the promulgation of the new constitution. Popular support is most widespread among Madhesis in the central and eastern Tarai and members of ethnic groups in the eastern hills. Many Madhesis are disillusioned with their leadership, but feel reforms are incomplete. The organisational landscape of ethnic activists in the eastern hills may be fragmented for now, but underneath lie strong personal and political networks. Activists are getting frustrated and the mood is becoming more militant. With an issue to rally around they are likely to coalesce; a politicised population would easily be mobilised for protest movements, should federalism not come.

Not all want federalism. Popular opposition to ethnic federalism in particular is substantial, by virtue of its association with identity politics. Many Brahmins and Chhetris, the dominant caste groups, fear they will lose out from the introduction of ethnic quotas and federal restructuring. But organised resistance is limited and fragmented. Open opposition only comes from a fringe of the political left which fears Nepal’s unity. Several Chhetri organisations are not against federalism itself but want to defend their group’s interests in the restructuring process. Pro-monarchy groups and the Hindu right are less concerned with federalism than with the republic and secularism. But given the common uneasiness with the redefinition of Nepali nationalism, a broader conservative alliance is a distinct possibility.

The structure emerging from the Constituent Assembly, federal but with a strong centre, offers a feasible compromise. If the NC overcomes its aversion to provinces named after ethnic and regional groups, the new constitution will offer important symbolic recognition of Nepal’s cultural diversity. In combination with the language rights and proportional representation in administration and government envisaged, this would go a long way towards meeting popular aspirations among ethnic and regional groups. The fact that the draft offers little scope for preferential rights beyond proportional representation as well as strong individual rights provisions should allay Brahmin and Chhetri fears of future discrimination. Not promulgating the constitution in time or deferring a decision on federalism, however, could spark serious unrest.

Kathmandu/Brussels, 13 January 2011

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/nepal/199-nepal-identity-politics-and-federalism.aspx